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Executive Summary
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) oversees countless criminal and civil investigations on behalf
of the federal government. Perhaps the most contentious and fraught are investigations that
implicate the president or other high-ranking executive branch officials. As the president is the
most senior official charged with ensuring that the “laws be faithfully executed,” these
situations almost invariably create actual or perceived conflicts of interest for investigators.
When the highest levels of the executive branch are compromised, political motivations can
impede meritorious investigations, especially when DOJ personnel are implicated. If high
ranking prosecutors or even the attorney general are suspected of illegality, it is inapposite to
the notion of an impartial investigation to allow them to influence the process.
To protect the integrity of investigations into high-level officials, the executive branch utilizes
special counsels. These individuals are experienced attorneys, brought in from outside the
government and empowered with authority and resources to conduct specific investigations.
Procedures related to special counsel investigations evolved over time. The title of the
attorneys who conducted the investigations also changed—from special prosecutor to
independent counsel to special counsel. Initially, the process for conducting the investigations
was informal. Presidents would appoint special prosecutors largely as a show of good faith and
to demonstrate that they were taking allegations of corruption seriously. Without formal
standards, there was nothing to prevent these investigations from being cut short if the
prosecutor proved too effective at rooting out misconduct within the government.
President Richard Nixon’s firing in 1973 of the special prosecutor investigating the Watergate
scandal prompted Congress to pass a law outlining the rules and procedures for the
investigations. The Ethics in Government Act allowed the attorney general to request a Special
Division of federal judges to appoint an independent counsel to conduct an investigation. The
DOJ utilized independent counsels to carry out several high-profile investigations, including the
inquiry into the Iran-Contra Affair, which involved the Reagan administration’s use of proceeds
from arms sales to Iran to fund rebels opposing Nicaragua’s socialist government. When the
constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act’s independent counsel provisions was
challenged in Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court upheld the statute as valid under the
Appointments Clause.
After former federal judge Kenneth Starr’s independent counsel investigation into President
William Clinton reached far beyond its original focus, many in Congress came to believe the
independent counsel law did not place sufficient checks on investigators. As a result, Congress
allowed the Ethics in Government Act to expire and the DOJ promulgated internal regulations
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granting the attorney general authority to appoint special prosecutors, renamed “special
counsels.”
The most recent investigation under these regulations was Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s
inquiry into Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election. The investigation, which faced
constant public criticism from President Donald Trump, produced indictments of several Trump
campaign officials. But the extensive report issued by Mueller’s office stated that there was
insufficient evidence to support criminal charges based on the Trump campaign coordinating
with the Russian efforts against the election. Additionally, the report declined to reach a
conclusion on whether Trump committed obstruction of justice by attempting to thwart
Mueller’s probe. Mueller submitted his report to Attorney General William Barr in accordance
with DOJ regulations. Several weeks later, the DOJ released a redacted version of the report to
the public. Barr released a summary of the report just days after receiving it that many,
including Mueller, felt mischaracterized the report to make the investigation’s findings appear
more favorable to Trump.
The Ethics in Government Act’s independent counsel provisions and the DOJ’s special counsel
regulation have both faced criticism. Under the Ethics in Government Act, an independent
counsel had such significant autonomy that lawmakers feared an unaccountable “runaway
prosecutor.” By contrast, observers of the Mueller investigation felt that the investigation was
handcuffed, particularly in regards to the reporting and public release of its findings.
Our recommendations for improving special counsel investigations seek to draw on elements of
both systems to balance the competing interests of prosecutorial independence and
accountability. We conclude that the country would be best served through a return to
legislation codifying specific procedures encompassing all phases of a special counsel
investigation.
1. Pre-Appointment: The attorney general should be responsible for conducting a
preliminary investigation to determine if allegations are sufficient to warrant
appointment of a special counsel. The DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility should
have an affirmative responsibility to continuously evaluate whether the attorney
general has potential conflicts of interest that would require an ethics consultation. To
prevent the attorney general from failing to appoint a special counsel when necessary,
we recommend two measures. First, the attorney general should be required to appoint
a special counsel whenever certain high-ranking executive officers, such as the
president, vice president, and Cabinet secretaries, are suspected of committing a crime
or become the “subject” of an investigation. Second, Congress should be able to petition
the attorney general to evaluate whether a special counsel investigation is necessary.
2. Appointment: A special counsel should be appointed by a Special Division of the federal
judiciary chosen by the chief justice of the United States. The Special Division’s
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appointment should be based on a recommendation from the attorney general. If the
Special Division rejects the attorney general’s proposed special counsel, the attorney
general should be able to propose another candidate.
3. Scope: The scope of a special counsel’s investigation should be subject to approval from
the Special Division judges. At the same time that the Special Division approved a special
counsel’s appointment, it would provide the special counsel with the scope of the
investigation. Changes to the scope would require approval from the Special Division.
The attorney general could refer matters in the special counsel’s ambit back to the DOJ,
but the Special Division could reverse any of those referrals. The special counsel would
have discretion to refer matters out of his or her office to the DOJ. This oversight of the
special counsel’s scope would prevent overly expansive investigations, while protecting
against the possibility that the attorney general might undermine the investigation by
limiting its range.
4. Oversight: The attorney general should have primary oversight of special counsel
investigations because the attorney general is better positioned than the courts or
Congress to make decisions about federal criminal investigations. To prevent
interference, the attorney general should be required to report to Congress whenever
he or she prevents the special counsel from taking any investigative or prosecutorial
step. Additionally, the special counsel’s budget should be periodically reported to
Congress.
5. Removal: Although the power to remove a special counsel should be exercised
sparingly, it has historically been vested and should remain with the attorney general.
But removal must be “for cause,” as defined in the current DOJ special counsel
regulations. The law should require the attorney general to submit a petition to remove
a special counsel to the Special Division for review to ensure that the “for cause”
standard is met.
6. Termination: When an investigation has reached a conclusion, the special counsel or
attorney general should have authority to formally terminate the investigation. The
Special Division should review a termination decision by the attorney general, but
should only withhold approval in extreme circumstances, such as when it is clear that
the attorney general is ending the investigation to obstruct it. Although it is important
to prevent “runaway” investigations, it is impractical to impose formal timelines or end
dates on investigations.
7. Release of Findings: At the close of an investigation, a special counsel should submit a
report to Congress on the investigation’s findings. The report should make a clear
statement as to whether the special counsel believes the subjects of the investigation
acted unlawfully, even when evaluating the president’s conduct. Congress should make
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public as much of the report as possible. Ensuring that the special counsel’s findings are
released with minimal interference recognizes that members of the executive branch
are accountable to Congress and the public.
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Introduction
At the Constitutional Convention, the framers vested power in the executive branch to ensure
the faithful execution of the laws, but they did not fully address how to handle the conflicts
interest that might emerge when the laws needed to be enforced against executive branch
officials. Over time, it became apparent that further protection was necessary to ensure that
the laws were applied equally, and, in 1875, the first special counsel (then called a “special
prosecutor”) was appointed to conduct an investigation of executive branch officials. Special
counsel investigations have since become an indispensable tool for rooting out corruption and
restoring the public’s confidence in government.
But special counsel investigations and the rules for conducting them have not been without
flaws. At times, the investigations have suffered deliberate attempts, including by the
president, to undermine them. Other times, special counsels have drawn criticism for
conducting excessively costly investigations without appropriate restraint.
This report examines past special counsel investigations and recommends a law with
procedures for future investigations that achieves a balance between independence and
accountability. The report begins with a history of significant previous special counsel
investigations. Next, the report analyzes each phase of a special counsel investigation,
discussing the approaches under the Ethics in Government Act and the current Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) regulations and presenting our recommendations for reforming the rules to help
ensure that the special counsel is protected from undue influence, but not over-empowered.

I. History
Special counsel investigations have scrutinized the executive branch since 1875. The
investigation of the Watergate scandal during the Nixon administration was a significant force
in ending Nixon’s presidency and led Congress to pass a law governing future investigations. But
the procedures in that law were ultimately abandoned by Congress after the independent
counsel investigation during the Clinton administration raised concerns that the law gave
investigators too much autonomy. The DOJ subsequently created regulations for conducting
the investigations, and those regulations guided the most recent special counsel investigation:
Robert Mueller’s probe of Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election.
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Early History
The early history of special counsel investigations began in 1875 during President Ulysses S.
Grant’s administration and continued into Harry S. Truman’s presidency in the 1950s.
1. President Ulysses S. Grant (Whiskey Ring Scandal)
In 1875, Secretary of the Treasury Benjamin Bristow began an anti-corruption campaign that
resulted in his agents uncovering “whiskey rings” in cities throughout the United States.1
Government officials tasked with collecting taxes and whiskey producers underreported the
production of whiskey in order to pay less federal tax and divided excess financial gains among
themselves.2 This fraud cost the federal government millions of dollars in lost revenue.3
In May 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant, then in his second term, appointed former Senator
John B. Henderson, a man known for his political independence, to prosecute the whiskey ring
participants.4 Henderson was the first special prosecutor appointed to investigate individuals
within the executive branch.5 His investigation quickly began to implicate high-level executive
branch officials, including Revenue Supervisor John McDonald.6 However, when Orville
Babcock, President Grant’s close friend and private secretary, became a target, Grant found
scrutiny of Babcock to be “unwarranted” and suspected that political enemies were using it to
“further discredit the Grant administration.”7 As a result, Grant fired Henderson in December
1875, only seven months into his investigation.8 Grant easily removed Henderson. There were
no laws or regulations that limited his discretion; the special prosecutor served purely at the
pleasure of the president.9 Henderson’s removal did not put an end to Grant’s troubles.
Secretary Bristow continued investigating, and, although Babcock was acquitted, others,
including McDonald and his assistant, were successfully prosecuted.10

1

See GERALD S. GREENBERG, HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS 163 (2000); Jennifer
Rose Hopper, Reexamining the Nineteenth-Century Presidency and Partisan Press: The Case of President Grant and
the Whiskey Ring Scandal, 42 SOC. SCI. HIST. 109, 115 (2018).
2
Hopper, supra note 1, at 115.
3
Id.
4
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 147, 163.
5
Id. at 147.
6
Id. at 163.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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2. President Theodore Roosevelt (Oregon Land Fraud Scandal & Post Office
Scandal)
During President Theodore Roosevelt’s tenure in office, special prosecutors were appointed for
two separate investigations: the Oregon Land Fraud Scandal and the Post Office Scandal. The
land fraud scandal centered around a stretch of public land from Portland to California that the
federal government and state of Oregon had granted to railroad companies.11 Congress had
passed a law allowing land around the new railroad to be sold to homestead farmers for very
low prices to stimulate settlement and growth.12 However, the land was not well-suited to
homestead farming; it was best adapted to ventures like raising cattle and lumbering.13 So,
state and federal officials, including members of the Department of the Interior, conspired to
fraudulently sell the land to people and companies seeking to use it for commercial purposes.14
U.S. Attorney John H. Hall was initially tasked with investigating the scheme. Other prosecutors
had expedited the fraudulent land claims, but Hall did not.15 As a result, in 1903, Attorney
General Philander Knox appointed a special prosecutor, Francis J. Heney, to take over the
investigation.16 Throughout the investigation, Heney’s willingness to aggressively pursue those
in power led some to push for his removal. Despite the pressure, Roosevelt continued to
support Heney’s independence.17 Heney’s investigation lasted seven years and culminated in
convictions against several individuals, including U.S. Attorney Hall, Congressman Binger
Hermann, Congressman John N. Williamson, and Senator John H. Mitchell.18
President Roosevelt appointed another special prosecutor, Charles J. Bonaparte, to investigate
corruption in the Post Office.19 Bonaparte’s appointment came in 1903 after Assistant Attorney
General John N. Tyner’s resignation. Tyner had been charged with destroying documents linked
to the investigation.20 After concluding his investigation, Bonaparte suggested reforms to the
Post Office and led prosecutions against Tyner, Postmaster General Charles Emory Smith, and
First Assistant Postmaster General Perry S. Heath.21 Though the prosecutions were mostly
unsuccessful, their initiation alone, in combination with the adoption of Bonaparte’s

11

Michael C. Blumm & Tim Wigington, The Oregon & California Railroad Grant Lands’ Sordid Past, Contentious
Present, and Uncertain Future: A Century of Conflict, 40 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 8, 12 (2013).
12
John Messing, Public Lands, Politics, and Progressives: The Oregon Land Fraud Trials, 1903-1910, 35 PAC. HIST.
REV. 35, 35 (1966).
13
Id. at 36.
14
Id. at 35; Giancarlo Panagia, The Political History of Federal Land Exchanges, ELECTRONIC GREEN J., no. 28, Spring
2009.
15
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 164-65; Messing, supra note 12, at 43-44.
16
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 165.
17
Id. at 290.
18
Id. at 165-66.
19
Id. at 290.
20
Id. at 29, 290-91.
21
Id.
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recommendations, led to substantive changes to the formerly corrupt agency.22 In 1906,
Roosevelt appointed Bonaparte to be attorney general.23
Although no statutes or regulations limited Roosevelt’s authority over the special prosecutors
appointed during his term, he supported their efforts and allowed them the independence they
needed to effectively carry out their work.24 Roosevelt’s own initiatives had spawned the
investigations, but he was a passionate advocate for government reform.25 As a result, these
inquiries did not evoke the same apparent ire as other investigations where the president’s
actions, personal life, or close associates came under suspicion.
3. President Calvin Coolidge (Teapot Dome Scandal)
The misconduct in the Teapot Dome Scandal took place during President Warren Harding’s
administration, but the responsibility to investigate it fell to President Calvin Coolidge, who
assumed office after Harding’s death in 1923.26 In the early 1900s, the Navy Department
controlled certain oil reserves.27 In 1921, at the behest of Interior Secretary Albert Fall,
President Harding issued an executive order transferring two vast naval oil reserves, Teapot
Dome and Elk Hills, from the Navy to the Interior Department.28 Once the transfer was
complete, Fall covertly leased both to oil companies.29 When President Coolidge took office, the
transactions had become a scandal. Media attention, congressional hearings, and accusations
of a DOJ cover-up forced Coolidge to take action.30 He appointed two special prosecutors, one
from each major political party. Coolidge nominated Republican lawyer Owen Roberts and
former Democratic Senator Atlee Pomerene for Senate confirmation.31 Pomerene and Roberts
were confirmed in February 1924, the only time the Senate has confirmed any special
prosecutor.32 The investigation led to the conviction of Secretary Fall for bribery and the
cancelation of the leases he brokered.33 During the investigation, a special committee found
that Attorney General Harry Daugherty had not adequately handled the case, and he was
forced to resign.34

22

See id. at 28-29.
Id.
24
See id. at 291.
25
Id. at 289-90.
26
Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2314 (1998).
27
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 75.
28
Id. at 87, 158-59.
29
Smaltz, supra note 26, at 2315.
30
See id.
31
Id. at 2316.
32
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 276.
33
Id.; Gary D. Libecap, The Political Allocation of Mineral Rights: A Re-Evaluation of Teapot, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 381,
382 (1984).
34
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 336.
23
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The Teapot Dome Scandal demonstrated that public outcry and fear of congressional action can
force the executive branch’s hand. The scandal also showed that congressional involvement in
the appointment of special prosecutors can improve Congress’s confidence in an investigation
and prevent it from taking more drastic actions to investigate. Additionally, congressional
confirmation forced Coolidge to carefully consider his nominees. In fact, his first two nominees
were not confirmed after their oil industry connections were revealed.35
4. President Harry S. Truman (Bureau of Internal Revenue Scandal)
Three decades after the Teapot Dome Scandal, President Harry Truman appointed a special
prosecutor to investigate allegations of misconduct within the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Before there was any suggestion of appointing a special prosecutor, an in-depth congressional
investigation, a series of prosecutions and convictions, and personnel changes were already
underway.36 To appease Congress, the public, and the media, Truman believed it was necessary
to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate corruption within his administration.37 Initially,
Truman planned to entrust the investigation to a three-person team of special prosecutors,
consisting of Alger Hiss, clergyman Daniel Poling, and Judge Thomas F. Murphy.38 This plan
quickly fell apart. Murphy withdrew and, soon after, Poling resigned.39
Truman then tasked Attorney General J. Howard McGrath with selecting a special prosecutor.
In February 1952, McGrath appointed Newbold Morris as the special prosecutor charged with
investigating the Bureau of Internal Revenue.40 Morris previously worked with New York Mayor
Fiorello La Guardia and was known for being “an irrepressible reformer.”41 Despite this
reputation, Morris had a brief and ineffective tenure as a special prosecutor.42 After Congress
denied him subpoena powers, Morris searched for alternative methods to conduct his
investigation.43 He decided to create a questionnaire that would collect detailed information
about the income and spending of federal government employees to determine whether their
spending matched their income.44 But Morris drew the ire of Attorney General McGrath by
sending him 596 copies of the questionnaire to be distributed among DOJ employees.45

35

Id. at 276.
Id. at 334.
37
Id.; see also Smaltz, supra note 26, at 2316.
38
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 232.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 231-32.
41
Id. at 232; The Administration: Exits and Entrances, TIME MAG. (Apr. 14, 1952),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,857104,00.html.
42
GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 232-33.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 232-33.
45
Id. at 233.
36
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McGrath objected to Morris’s “aggressive approach” and fired him in April 1952.46 In response
to Morris’s dismal, President Truman fired McGrath.47 Though another special prosecutor for
this matter was never appointed, those responsible for corruption within the Bureau of Internal
Revenue were brought to justice through standard prosecutions.48

Watergate Through the Ethics in Government Act
The special prosecutor investigation into the Watergate Scandal reached previously unseen
levels of prominence and importance. Shortly after Elliot Richardson’s appointment as attorney
general in 1973, he named Archibald Cox as special prosecutor to investigate the spiraling
Watergate scandal.49 Despite White House denials of any involvement in a break-in at the
Democratic National Committee’s offices, the investigation into the incident had drawn
progressively closer to the Oval Office.50 Testimony at congressional hearings had implicated
Nixon’s top aides and suggested that the White House had deliberately acted to minimize
backlash from the investigation. Nixon had responded by asking for the resignation of the
attorney general and White House counsel and by nominating Richardson as the new attorney
general.51 During his confirmation hearings, Richardson had announced that he would appoint a
special prosecutor and not interfere with the ensuing investigations.52 Cox’s appointment soon
sparked unprecedented conflict in the executive branch.
The dispute began when former White House Counsel John Dean told prosecutors and
Congress that he believed conversations in the Oval Office were being taped.53 Following the
testimony of Dean and others, the significance of Nixon’s recording system became clear. Cox
served a subpoena on Nixon for the tapes. When Nixon refused to comply, Cox secured a court
order directing him to produce the tapes. Nixon challenged the order, arguing that the tapes
were protected by executive privilege.54 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

46

Id. at 222, 233.
Id.
48
Id. at 346.
49
Id. at 286.
50
See Heidi Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn’t Bothered?, 45 IND. L. REV. 89, 101-02 (2011). See also McCord
Declares That Mrs. Mitchell Was Forcibly Held, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1975),
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/19/archives/mccord-declares-that-mrs-mitchell-was-forcibly-held-commentfrom.html.
51
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Principled Resignation of Thomas More, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 63, 64 (1997).
52
Id.; WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT 172 (1975); see Anthony
Ripley, Senate Speedily Confirms Richardson by 82—3 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/24/archives/senate-speedily-confirms-richardson-by-823-voterichardson.html.
53
See Samuel Dash, Congress’ Spotlight on the Watergate Hearings, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1719, 1732-35 (1994).
54
WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, supra, note 52, at 90-92.
47
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rejected Nixon’s argument, and ordered that the tapes be produced or submitted to the court
for in camera review.55
Instead of complying, Nixon proposed releasing summaries of the tapes to be verified by a
chosen senator, and called on Cox to “cease all further attempts to obtain Presidential
materials through the courts.”56 Cox refused, and, on October 20, Nixon ordered Richardson to
fire him. Rather than carry out the order, Richardson resigned in protest, followed quickly by
Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, in what the press dubbed the “Saturday Night
Massacre.” The order fell to the next most senior DOJ official, Solicitor General Robert Bork,
who, at last, dismissed Cox.57 If Nixon experienced any reprieve, it was short-lived. Public outcry
was tremendous, and the press demanded the appointment of another special prosecutor.58
On November 1, only 12 days after Cox’s firing, Bork, with Nixon’s approval, appointed Leon
Jaworski as special prosecutor to resume the investigation.59
In early 1974, Jaworski issued a subpoena for the same tapes that cost Cox his position. This
time, under considerable public pressure, Nixon released edited transcripts of a select number
of tapes and moved to have the D.C. District Court quash the subpoena.60 The district court
again rejected Nixon’s assertion of executive privilege, and ordered him to comply with
Jaworski’s subpoena.61 The case went directly to the Supreme Court.62 The Court’s decision in
the landmark case, U.S. v. Nixon, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, considered the limits
of executive privilege at length. The Court upheld the district court’s ruling, asserting that
executive privilege does not allow the president to withhold evidence that is relevant to a
criminal proceeding.63 The unanimous decision helped define the outer limits of executive
privilege.

55

In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, *14 (D.D.C. 1973), aff’d sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
56
John M. Crewdson, Richardson Quits Over Order on Cox, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/21/archives/richardson-quits-over-order-on-cox-attorney-general-says-hecouldnt.html; Don Bivens, Watergate Inspires After 40 Years, 40 LITIG. 4, 4 (2014).
57
Bivens, supra note 56, at 5.
58
Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence and Constitutional
Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 12-13 (1987).
59
Anthony Ripley, Jaworski Assumes Office; Bork Praises Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/11/06/archives/jaworski-assumes-office-bork-praises-prosecutor-8-to-beconsulted.html.
60
United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326, 1328, 1330 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974).
61
Id. at 1331.
62
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
63
Id. at 713.
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Another Watergate era test of presidential powers came from a lawsuit challenging Cox’s
firing.64 Although Jaworski had already been appointed, the D.C. District Court, in Nader v. Bork,
stated that it was important to address the legality of Cox’s dismissal to “give guidance for
future conduct with regard to the Watergate inquiry.”65 The court held that firing Cox was
illegal because he had not engaged in the extraordinary impropriety required by DOJ
regulations.66 The decision was later vacated after U.S. v. Nixon was decided, but the case
provided a platform for the court to admonish Nixon and his administration for dismissing
Cox.67
The Watergate investigation changed the way the public and politicians viewed the nature and
purpose of special prosecutor investigations. Previously, appointment of a special prosecutor
was a tool the president used to ensure that the executive branch could objectively investigate
its own officials. After Watergate, the special prosecutor served the pursuit of justice even if it
meant pursuing the president. Nixon’s brazen attempts to undermine the efforts of the special
prosecutor convinced Congress to focus on special prosecutors’ role. If they were to be the
nation’s instrument for fighting high-level corruption, lawmakers thought additional protection
was needed to insulate the position from the president and other executive branch officials.
On October 26, 1978, almost five years to the date of Cox’s dismissal, President Jimmy Carter
signed into law the Ethics in Government Act, which, among other government ethics reforms,
created procedures for conducting independent counsel investigations.68 In addition to creating
the new “independent counsel” title, the law provided more robust protections against
removal. The law also set out circumstances that would require the attorney general to appoint
an independent counsel and required a more intensive confirmation process.69 In the aftermath
of Watergate, Congress sought to create an office that could withstand the type of
underhanded methods observed during the Nixon administration, and, in doing so, established
a position with near-limitless discretion and limited checks on its authority. But the debate over
the office of independent counsel was far from over.

Post-Watergate Investigations Under the Ethics in Government Act
Approximately 20 independent counsels were appointed under the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 before it expired in 1999.70 During this time, a few investigations stand out. The first,

64

See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973)
Id. at 106.
66
Id. at 108.
67
Nader v. Levi, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16791 (D.D.C. 1975).
68
Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601, 604, 608-09 (1998).
69
See Adrianne C. Blake, You’re Fired! Special Counsel Removal Authority and the Separation of Powers, 48 U. BALT.
L. REV. 93, 100 (2018).
70
Smaltz, supra note 26, at 2323.
65
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beginning during President Ronald Reagan’s second term in 1986, was an investigation of highranking executive branch officials as part of what is commonly known as the Iran-Contra
affair.71 Lawrence E. Walsh72 was appointed independent counsel to investigate a sale of arms
to Iran in violation of an embargo and the subsequent diversion of the proceeds to support the
right-wing rebel groups in Nicaragua known as the Contras.73 The investigation resulted in
criminal charges against 14 individuals and several convictions, including of former Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs John Poindexter and former National Security Council
staffer Oliver North.74 But these convictions were ultimately overturned, as Walsh’s
investigation and subsequent prosecutions were met with fierce opposition.
Critics chided Walsh for a variety of alleged missteps, such as the exorbitant cost of the
investigation and prosecutions.75 Over six years, the government spent $35 million, prompting
public backlash.76 The legacy of the Iran-Contra affair “will likely be lost in the tumultuousness
of the time and extravagance of this amount.”77 However, not all were opposed to Walsh’s
investigation. In 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno testified regarding the reauthorization of
the independent counsel statute, stating, “The Iran-Contra investigation, far from providing
support for doing away with the Act, proves its necessity . . . [T]his investigation could not have
been conducted under the supervision of the Attorney General and concluded with any public
confidence in its thoroughness or impartiality.”78
The 1994 investigation of then-Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy garnered similar criticism.
Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz investigated allegations that Espy accepted improper gifts,
including sports tickets, lodging, and airfare.79 The investigation lasted four years and cost over
$20 million.80 Smaltz’s office charged 13 individuals and six businesses with crimes, and 14 were
convicted or pleaded guilty. Espy was indicted, but was acquitted on all 39 counts at trial.81
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The next notable investigation began in 1994, when Kenneth Star was appointed independent
counsel to investigate financial transactions involving President William Clinton and First Lady
Hillary Clinton. Specifically, Starr probed the relationship between the Clintons and a series of
purportedly fraudulent loans and real estate investments surrounding the Whitewater
Development Corporation and other entities.82 The investigation led to several criminal
charges, but none against the president or first lady.83 Although the Whitewater allegations
served as the impetus for the investigation, they would ultimately have little to do with its
legacy.
Starr’s eventual report led to Clinton’s impeachment.84 The investigation into the failed
Arkansas land deal had already concluded when the judges overseeing Starr’s investigation
assigned his office to investigate allegations that Clinton perjured himself during a deposition in
Clinton v. Jones, a sexual harassment lawsuit against Clinton.85 The ensuing investigation
confirmed that Clinton had engaged a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinski, a White House
intern. Drawing on Starr’s report to Congress, the House of Representatives impeached Clinton
for perjury and obstruction of justice based on Clinton’s statements under oath about the
relationship and his other alleged actions to cover it up. The Senate acquitted Clinton on both
articles of impeachment.86
Starr has subsequently commented that there should have been another independent counsel
to take on the Lewinsky investigation, but the only practical option was for his office to handle
it given the lack of time and political appetite for another independent counsel.87 Even though
Starr had recommended that his team take on the additional inquiry, he now asserts that “the
most fundamental thing that could have been done differently” would have been for the
Lewinsky matter to be investigated by others.88
Although many found Clinton’s actions reproachable, others were equally outraged that the
investigation strayed far beyond its initial focus to a public airing of Clinton’s sexual misconduct.
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Indeed, Starr’s investigation received extensive criticism for its expansive jurisdiction, and many
alleged that it lacked appropriate restraint.89
Each investigation under the Ethics and Government Act elicited criticism and sparked fierce
debate over the Act’s continued existence. The investigations faced criticisms from members of
Congress and the public for exceeding their authority, either through unjustified expenditures
of resources or overly expansive inquiries. It appeared to many that an independent counsel
could keep investigating and spending without limit until some sort of wrongdoing was
uncovered. Following the Iran-Contra and Whitewater investigations, debate intensified over
the scope, cost, and value of these investigations. Ultimately, Congress allowed the
independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act to expire in 1999 with
bipartisan support, marking the end of statutory law governing special counsel investigations to
this day.90

The Modern Special Counsel Office
To fill the void left by the expiration of the independent counsel law, the DOJ promulgated new
regulations in 1999.91 The rules gave the attorney general authority to appoint special counsels
without seeking confirmation from a panel of judges, which the Ethics in Government Act had
required.92 Although the appointee would no longer be referred to as an independent counsel,
a special counsel would serve the same role: to conduct investigations that pose conflicts of
interest for the DOJ.93 Taking into consideration the concerns that led to the expiration of the
Ethics in Government Act, special counsels have less autonomy than independent counsels.
Specifically, the attorney general (or deputy attorney general in the event of a recusal) oversees
the investigations and has the authority to appoint and remove special counsels.94 Because
these regulations were not promulgated pursuant to the notice-and-comment process outlined
in the Administrative Procedure Act,95 the DOJ can unilaterally rescind them at any time,96 and
the rescission would not be subject to judicial review.
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The most recent special counsel investigation occurred in the wake of the 2016 election of
President Donald Trump. Throughout the campaign, the Trump campaign’s connections to
Russia and its election interference efforts were a frequent subject of speculation.97 In the early
months of the Trump administration, FBI Director James Comey revealed that the FBI had
opened an investigation before the election into the campaign’s ties to Russia.98 During the
investigation, Trump purportedly pressured Comey to cease the investigation of Michael Flynn,
the national security advisor and one of Trump’s most visible supporters during the campaign.99
Attorney General Jeff Sessions recused himself from overseeing the investigations into Russian
campaign interference due to his work for the Trump campaign. Supervision of the
investigations fell to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein.100 Trump fired Comey on May 9,
2017,101 and, as public outcry reached a crescendo in the following week, Rosenstein appointed
Robert Mueller to serve as special counsel.102 Mueller’s mandate included the authority to
investigate “any links and/or coordination” between the Russian government and the Trump
campaign as well as “matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation.”103
Rosenstein’s selection of Mueller was met with widespread approval.104 A former FBI director,
Mueller was highly respected by Republicans and Democrats alike. Initially appointed FBI
director by President George W. Bush, President Barack Obama had taken the unusual step of
extending Mueller’s ten-year term by two years with congressional approval.105
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After the Special Counsel’s Office assumed control of the investigation, Mueller assembled a
group of renowned prosecutors.106 Trump and his allies frequently attacked the investigation,
often referring to it as a “witch hunt.”107 At one point, Trump allegedly demanded Mueller’s
firing, only to back down when White House Counsel Donald McGahn threatened to resign
rather than ask the DOJ to carry out the directive.108
Over the course of approximately two years, the Mueller team indicted 34 individuals.109 They
secured convictions against several members of Trump’s inner circle, including campaign
manager Paul Manafort and longtime confidant and political strategist Roger Stone.110 As the
inquiry expanded, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein stated that he would recuse himself
from overseeing it if his role in Comey’s firing became a point of contention,111 but he never
did. Mueller’s investigation primarily sought to address two issues: (1) whether members of the
Trump campaign conspired with Russian operatives to aid in Trump’s election victory and (2)
whether Trump illegally obstructed the investigation.
In March 2019, the Special Counsel’s Office concluded its investigation and summarized its
findings in a voluminous report. The report concluded that Russia had made a concerted effort
to aid the Trump campaign through a social media misinformation campaign as well as
“hacking-and-dumping” operations, which involved the release of emails stolen from members
of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and the Democratic National Committee.112
Nevertheless, Mueller and his team concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to support
conspiracy charges against Trump campaign officials,113 although several were convicted at trial
or pled guilty to lying to investigators.114 Mueller declined to make a prosecutorial decision on
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whether Trump committed obstruction of justice,115 but also refused to exonerate him.116 This
decision was grounded in the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion that it would be unconstitutional
to indict a sitting president.117
In accordance with DOJ rules, the Special Counsel’s Office submitted its report to Attorney
General William Barr.118 Two days later, Barr sent a four-page letter to Congress, in which he
claimed to summarize the report’s contents.119 However, three days later, Mueller wrote a
letter to Barr asserting that the letter to Congress did not accurately reflect the report’s
contents.120 Eventually, the DOJ released a redacted copy of the Mueller report to the public.121
Allegations that Barr misled the public regarding the contents of the report and that redacted
materials were inappropriately withheld continue to this day.122
As with prior special prosecutor investigations, the events of the Mueller investigation spurred
talk of reforming the system.123 Some commentators have criticized Mueller for his refusal to
make a decision regarding Trump’s conduct and for the manner in which his findings were
conveyed to the public.124 Even one of the most senior prosecutors in Mueller’s office, Andrew
Weissmann, voiced criticisms. In a book he wrote about the investigation, Weissmann said
Mueller’s team should have been more aggressive, such as by subpoenaing Trump for an
interview and probing Trump’s financial records. He claimed that the decisions to shy away
from more assertive tactics were influenced by concerns that Trump would fire Mueller.125
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Mueller rejected Weissmann’s critiques, dismissing them as based on “incomplete
information.”126
The Mueller report has not established a consensus regarding the Trump campaign’s
connections to Russia and the president’s role in a possible cover-up. Some use the report as
proof of misconduct, while Trump claims “Total EXONERATION.”127

II. Reform Recommendations
To provide for independent investigations that ameliorate actual or perceived conflicts of
interest in the DOJ, we recommend restoring a statutory scheme for regulating special counsel
investigations. Under our proposal, the power to appoint and oversee special counsels would
be balanced between the attorney general and a special division of the federal judiciary
consisting of a three-judge panel. This approach would divide the responsibilities pertaining to
preliminary investigations, appointment, the scope of authority, oversight, removal,
termination, and release of findings. Congress would have additional checks and oversight
power. This Part explains each aspect of the proposal, including by drawing on comparisons to
the past and current approaches to special counsel investigations. Our recommendations are
divided into seven elements and are summarized as follows:
1. Pre-Appointment: While the attorney general retains authority and discretion to
conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether a special counsel is needed,
our proposed statute provides for more formal recusal standards and checks on inaction
by the attorney general.
2. Appointment: The attorney general nominates and the Special Division of the judiciary
confirms special counsels.
3. Scope of Authority: The Special Division sets the initial scope of an investigation and
reviews any proposed changes to that scope.
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4. Oversight: The attorney general maintains primary oversight of the investigation, but
the attorney general is required to submit reports to Congress whenever he or she
prevents the special counsel from taking an action.
5. Removal: The attorney general is authorized to remove a special counsel with approval
from the Special Division.
6. Termination: Investigations will have no formal timelines; termination of investigations
can be triggered either by the special counsel or the attorney general with the Special
Division’s consent.
7. Release of Findings: The special counsel must submit a report at the conclusion of his or
her investigation to the chairs and ranking members of the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees. The report must include a clear statement as to whether the special
counsel believes the subjects of the investigation committed crimes, including evidence
gathered and investigative methods used to reach that determination.

Pre-Appointment
Prior to the appointment of a special counsel, the DOJ has historically conducted a preliminary
investigation to determine whether a special counsel is necessary. These preliminary
investigations have typically been spurred by pressure from Congress and the public.
1. Ethics in Government Act
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the first stage of a potential independent counsel inquiry
consisted of a preliminary investigation conducted by the attorney general. The Act required
the DOJ to conduct such an investigation upon receiving information suggesting that high-level
executive branch officials may have broken the law.128 The details of the investigation remained
confidential, but the attorney general was obligated to inform the judges on the Special
Division of its existence.129 If, after 30 days, the attorney general determined that the
information was credible, the preliminary investigation would be extended for up to 90 days.
Based on the conclusions of that investigation and the credibility of the allegation, the attorney
general was authorized to request that the special division appoint an independent counsel.
Using information provided by the attorney general, the court would select an independent
counsel to oversee the investigation.130
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2. Current Department of Justice Regulations
Under the DOJ’s current regulations, a special counsel is appointed by the attorney general, at
his or her discretion, pursuant to his or her general administrative hiring authority.131 Like the
prior regime, appointment virtually always takes place after the DOJ conducts a preliminary
investigation.132 The regulations specify that, in the event of an attorney general’s recusal from
the matter for a conflict of interest, the deputy attorney general handles appointment and
oversight.133
Attorney General Sessions’ recusal from initiating and overseeing the Mueller investigation was
virtually inescapable under DOJ guidelines,134 given his involvement with the Trump campaign
and his meetings with the Russian ambassador during the campaign, which he failed to disclose
during his Senate confirmation hearings.135 But the recusal did not come until a watchdog
organization filed a complaint with the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility, and Sessions’
subsequent consultation with that office, that he recused himself from the investigation.136
Sessions also faced a “Republican chorus of calls for recusal that forced the issue.”137
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3. Recommendation
Under our proposal, the attorney general would still conduct a preliminary investigation. This
phase of the investigation should remain in the DOJ’s purview, given the executive branch’s
constitutional and historic responsibility for originating criminal investigations. But the lack of a
remedy for inaction under the Ethics in Government Act and the current special counsel
regulations is problematic. Accordingly, to further the goal of striking a balance between
independence and accountability while respecting constitutional separation of powers, our
proposed statute would increase accountability for attorneys general in their decisions to
recuse themselves from special counsel investigations and to pursue appointments of special
counsels.
The proposed statutory scheme would provide more precise standards for determining when
an attorney general should recuse himself or herself from an investigation. It would formally
require DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”),138 or another internal DOJ ethics
entity, to ensure a review is conducted of the attorney general’s potential conflicts of interest.
OPR would have an affirmative responsibility to continuously review whether an ethics or
conflict of interest consultation should take place, especially when investigations involve
certain high-level executive branch officials, such as the president, vice president, and Cabinet
secretaries. Examples from the American Bar Association Model rules on conflicts of interest,
including personal conflicts, financial conflicts, material limitations and more, could supplement
the DOJ’s existing guidelines.139 Following a consultation, OPR could submit a report that makes
a recommendation as to whether the attorney general’s recusal is necessary. The attorney
general could decline to recuse himself or herself, but would be required to appear before the
House or Senate Judiciary Committee to explain the decision.
We also recommend a mechanism for challenging an attorney general’s refusal to appoint or
consider appointing a special counsel. Our proposed statute would provide standards that
trigger an obligation for the attorney general to appoint a special counsel or open a preliminary
investigation to determine whether appointment of a special counsel is necessary. First, the
statute would require appointment of a special counsel when certain high-level executive
branch officials, such as the president, vice president, attorney general, and Cabinet secretaries,
are suspected of personally having committed a federal crime and deemed a “subject” of an

138

See OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opr (last visited July 14,
2020) (“OPR’s primary mission is to ensure that Department attorneys perform their duties in accordance with the
high professional standards expected of the nation’s principal law enforcement agency . . . OPR’s primary
responsibility is to investigate allegations that Department attorneys, prosecutors, and immigration judges have
committed misconduct while performing their duties to investigate, litigate, or give legal advice.”).
139
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.7: Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_con
duct/rule_1_7_conflict_of_interest_current_clients/ (last visited July 14, 2020).

22

Democracy Clinic

investigation.140 Second, the statute would allow the chairs and ranking members of the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees to petition the attorney general to initiate an investigation or
the appointment process. A mix of Democrats and Republicans always hold these positions,
which would make the petition process viable regardless of which party controlled the White
House. After a petition’s submission, the attorney general would have 21 days to appoint a
special counsel or submit an explanation of the decision not to. Even though members of
Congress could not mandate appointment of a special counsel through this process, it is
apparent throughout history that public and political pressure is usually the catalyst behind
special counsel appointments.141

Appointment
The power to appoint a special counsel has alternated between the attorney general and the
judiciary over the last century.142 Prior to passage of the Ethics in Government Act, special
prosecutors were not appointed pursuant to any particular statutory authority. Instead, the
president or attorney general would appoint a special prosecutor at their discretion.143 Perhaps
the most significant change to special counsel procedures under the Ethics in Government Act
was the establishment of new mechanisms for appointment of those charged with leading
independent investigations and prosecutions.144 Virtually all special counsel appointees since
passage of the Ethics and Government Act have been highly regarded and respected.145 In fact,
attorneys general have historically selected aggressive special counsels, decisions, which, in
many cases, may have been motivated by political considerations, such as warding off criticism
and ensuring that findings that benefit officials are viewed as credible by the public.146
1. Ethics in Government Act
The Ethics in Government Act provided for appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate
and prosecute high-ranking executive branch officials under certain circumstances. The statute
provided for appointment of “independent counsels” by a three-judge panel, called a “Special
Division” of the judiciary, upon the attorney general’s request.147 The conclusions resulting
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from the preliminary investigation determined whether an independent counsel would be
appointed, leaving significant discretion to the attorney general. The statute directed the
attorney general to request an independent counsel appointment where he or she either: (1)
deemed that further investigation was warranted following the preliminary investigation or (2)
failed to determine that investigation was not warranted after the passing of the 90-day
window for the preliminary investigation.148 If the attorney general requested appointment, he
or she was required to provide the Special Division with sufficient information to assist in
selecting the independent counsel and defining the investigation’s scope and jurisdiction.149
The Special Division then had final authority to select the independent counsel.150
In 1988, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson held that the judiciary’s role in the
appointment of an independent counsel was constitutional.151 The Court deemed the
independent counsel’s role to be one of an “inferior” officer, who reports to a “principal”
officer (the attorney general).152 Independent counsels’ status as inferior officers, in the Court’s
analysis, prevented their appointment by the judiciary from violating separation-of-powers
principles and the constitutional requirement that the president nominate principal officers.153
Indeed, other special courts with limited powers have been established from time to time.154
Even after Morrison, there has been significant debate over the constitutionality of legislation
allowing courts to appoint special counsels. Opponents maintain that judicial appointment is
barred by the Appointments Clause’s requirement that the president nominate certain
executive branch officials with the advice and consent of the Senate.155 And although Congress
may establish executive branch agencies and conduct oversight of those entities, it is prohibited
from engaging in criminal prosecutions, which fall within the purview of the executive powers
granted to the president in Article II.156 Accordingly, legislation granting the judiciary the power
to appoint special counsels may raise concerns of impermissible congressional aggrandizement.
But proponents of the Ethics in Government Act cite Morrison’s reasoning and argue that
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legislation calling for judicial appointment provides a meaningful device for checks and balances
by insulating investigations of executive officials from improper interference from the executive
branch.157
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations
The current DOJ regulations do not involve the federal judiciary; the power to appoint special
counsels remains with the attorney general. The goal of this aspect of the regulations was to
shift the balance between independence and accountability more toward accountability in light
of the concerns about the wide scopes of the Iran-Contra and Whitewater investigations.158
Under current regulations, appointment is warranted only in the most “extraordinary
circumstances,” where normal DOJ investigative processes would result in a conflict of interest
or the public interest would be best served by removing responsibility from the DOJ.159
The attorney general has almost complete discretion in determining whether and when
appointment is appropriate, but there are some guidelines as to who can be appointed. A
special counsel must come from outside of the government and must be a lawyer with a
reputation for integrity and impartial decision making, along with appropriate experience.160
The attorney general may appoint a special counsel immediately, conduct a preliminary
investigation first, or simply attempt to mitigate any conflicts of interest within the DOJ,
including through recusal of particular individuals.161
Proponents of the existing regulations might argue that an increased role for the attorney
general in appointment is needed to prevent out of control investigations. Conversely,
opponents might argue that in an age of growing politicization of the attorney general position,
the regulations give a partisan attorney general power to prevent credible investigations into
political allies. Indeed, as Professor Jed Shugerman asserts, “the twentieth century ushered in
more partisan insiders, hacks, and fixers, just as the DOJ’s power grew enormously.”162 With no
statutory right of action or means of judicial review, the power to appoint individuals charged
with investigating the executive branch rests solely within the executive branch.
3. Recommendation
Our proposed statute provides an appointment scheme where the attorney general would
nominate a special counsel to be confirmed by a Special Division of judiciary comprised of a
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three-judge panel appointed by the chief justice of the United States.163 Given the Supreme
Court’s holding in Morrison, the Special Division’s role in the appointment process should not
be vulnerable to legal challenges. Subjecting the attorney general’s selection to the Special
Division’s approval provides a layer of security against appointment of an ill-suited special
counsel, and promotes both independence and accountability of special counsels.
If the Special Division rejected a proposed appointee, the attorney general would be allowed to
propose another candidate. Our recommendation envisions that the special division would give
broad deference to the attorney general in approving the special counsel nominee, and would
only reject a nominee upon a clear showing of good cause, such as where the nominee clearly
lacked requisite experience or had a conflict of interest.

Scope
Defining and controlling the scope of a special counsel investigation presents significant
challenges related to objectivity, efficiency, and the separation of powers. Kenneth Starr’s
broad scope during the Whitewater investigation was a significant consideration in Congress’s
decision to allow the Ethics in Government Act to expire in 1999.164 Although considerable
deference to the independent counsel proved fatal to the Act, it was initially seen as a
necessary precaution to prevent a biased attorney general from stunting an investigation.
President Nixon’s attempt to end the special prosecutor investigation into the Watergate
scandal and Attorney General Mitchell’s involvement in the scandal made robust discretion for
the independent counsel seem essential.165 Reform must strike a balance between restraint of
powers and freedom from interference.
1. Ethics in Government Act
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the formal scope of an independent counsel’s jurisdiction
would be defined by the Special Division of the judiciary at the outset of the investigation.166
The independent counsel was vested with the power of the entire DOJ other than those powers
reserved explicitly for the attorney general,167 and the Independent Counsel’s Office was
entitled to request any assistance or provisions from the DOJ necessary for the investigation,
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not subject to any budgetary limits.168 With these considerable powers at hand, independent
counsels were able to undertake wide-ranging investigations.169
The primary purpose of the Ethics in Government Act’s independent counsel rules was to
insulate the independent counsel from executive control. Granting the judiciary power to
define the scope of the investigation, rather than the attorney general, was a crucial step to
achieving that insulation. A biased attorney general with the power to define scope would be
able to tailor the scope of an investigation to affect its outcome. Placing this responsibility with
the judiciary provided an objective check against politicization and supported the perception
that the investigations were unbiased. The principal objection to this provision was that it
violated the separation of powers doctrine.170 Many saw the power to define the scope of an
investigation as a purely executive function and believed the judiciary’s involvement was an
improper encroachment on the executive branch’s powers. But the Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to the law on this basis in Morrison.171
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations
The current DOJ regulations let the attorney general determine the special counsel’s
jurisdiction “with a specific factual statement of the matter to be investigated.”172 The
regulations also give the special counsel authority to investigate any federal crimes committed
related to the investigation, such as obstruction of justice.173 A special counsel must receive
authorization from the attorney general to expand the scope of an investigation beyond its
original mandate.174 Independent counsels under the Ethics in Government Act had the
“independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions [] of the
Department of Justice,”175 whereas special counsels are only vested with the “investigative and
prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.”176 Although this change has had little
effect on the formal powers of the special counsel, it denotes a clear shift in the perception of
the role. By likening the office to “any U.S. Attorney,” the regulation sends a clear message that
the special counsel is subordinate to the attorney general, like all other DOJ employees.

168

See Gormley, supra note 68, at 674.
See BROWN & COLE, supra note 84, at 6-7.
170
Id. at 24.
171
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-96 (1988).
172
28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a) (1999).
173
Id.
174
28 C.F.R. § 600.4(b) (1999).
175
28 U.S.C. § 594 (1994).
176
28 C.F.R. § 600.6 (1999).
169

27

Democracy Clinic

3. Recommendation
To protect the scope of investigations from improper influence, we recommend placing the
authority to define scope with the three-judge panel of the Special Division. At the same time
that the panel approved the attorney general’s proposed appointee, it would provide the
special counsel with the initial scope of the investigation. Once the investigation was underway,
any changes to the formal scope of the investigation would require approval from the Special
Division.
Deferring to the judiciary is essential to insulate investigations from political interference, but
the judiciary’s role should be balanced with input from the attorney general to ensure that the
investigation proceeds efficiently. Accordingly, the attorney general would still have input over
what matters fall within the scope of an investigation and what matters may be referred back
to the DOJ. Allowing the attorney general to retain this power would enable investigations to
function more smoothly, and it would respect the attorney general’s autonomy. However, if the
attorney general referred a matter discovered by the special counsel back to the DOJ, he or she
would need to submit a report to the Special Division explaining the decision. The special
counsel would also have the ability to refer investigative matters or prosecutions to the DOJ, as
Mueller often did in his recent investigation, resulting in an additional 14 prosecutions.177 This
system would allow the attorney general to exercise discretion over a core executive function,
while providing for review of that discretion. If the Special Division determined that the
attorney general made an improper decision, it could return the matter in question back to the
Special Counsel’s Office. Further, issuing reports to the judiciary creates a paper trail of the
attorney general’s decisions and reasoning, and would incentivize the attorney general to act
appropriately, if only to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
In contrast to more overt efforts to undermine an investigation, such as firing the special
counsel, limiting the scope of an investigation would be a more covert and potentially
untraceable way to interfere with an investigation. Our recommended reform addresses this
unique problem by compelling the attorney general to justify such decisions to an independent
third party or, where necessary, by removing those decisions from his or her discretion entirely.
However, the attorney general would maintain enough discretion, combined with oversight
powers, to keep an overzealous special counsel properly restrained.
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Oversight
The Ethics in Government Act provided for minimal oversight of independent counsel
investigations. The only meaningful oversight power was the attorney general’s authority to fire
the independent counsel in a narrow set of circumstances with approval from the Special
Division.178 The current regulations grant the attorney general more oversight power and
emphasize that the special counsel is subordinate to the attorney general.179 However, even
when the attorney general does not tamper in special counsel investigations, the present
system creates the potential that the public might perceive the investigations as unfair and
biased.
1. Ethics in Government Act
Oversight represented one of the biggest challenges to legislators following the Watergate
scandal. Congress knew it needed to prevent another incident like the Saturday Night
Massacre, but some members feared that an office with too much autonomy could lead to
unrestrained, politically-charged investigations that exceeded their original mandates.180 The
Ethics in Government Act did not create a completely unfettered independent counsel, but
there was effectively only one check on the investigations: the attorney general’s ability—with
approval of the Special Division—to dismiss independent counsels for “good cause” or a
condition, such as a health problem, that substantially impaired the independent counsel’s
performance.181 The Act largely succeeded in preventing interference from the executive
branch, but concerns about excessive autonomy came to be widely held by members of
Congress. In just two decades, Congress fully reversed its position. It went from fearing the
executive branch would unjustly interfere with the duties of an independent counsels to
handing power back to the executive branch to craft rules for the investigations.
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations
Under the current DOJ regulations, the special counsel remains subject to all DOJ rules,
regulations, and procedures and answers directly to the attorney general.182 A special counsel is
“not subject to day-to-day supervision,” but the attorney general has the right to request an
explanation for any investigative or procedural step.183 The attorney general can direct the
special counsel not to take a proposed action if the attorney general believes it is inappropriate
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or unwarranted, but the attorney general must report such a decision to Congress.184 These
provisions provide safeguards against a runaway special counsel while offering some assurance
that the attorney general cannot divert the course of the investigation without detection by
Congress.
3. Recommendation
We recommend keeping primary oversight of special counsel investigations with the attorney
general. As the special counsel’s superior and head of the DOJ, the attorney general is in the
best position to oversee and provide resources to special counsel investigations. Our proposed
statute would retain the rules for oversight in the current regulations, including the
requirement that the attorney general report to Congress whenever he or she prevents the
special counsel from taking an action. There have not been reports of significant interference
by the attorney general in the investigations conducted under the current regulations. A
compromised attorney general could certainly affect the course of an investigation by
tampering with its budget. Accordingly, our proposal would require that the special counsel’s
budget be periodically reported to Congress, which would put political pressure on the attorney
general to give the Special Counsel’s Office the resources it needs.
Congress should not be granted new powers to oversee special counsel investigations.
Overseeing criminal investigation is within the purview of the executive branch. Additionally,
leaving oversight to the DOJ helps preserve the confidentiality of investigations; information
leaks might be more likely with direct congressional involvement. Further, Congress retains its
own considerable investigative powers, as seen during the Watergate investigation.185 Giving
Congress oversight of both avenues of investigation could result in duplicative efforts and limit
the effectiveness of special counsel investigations.

Removal
The procedures for removing special counsels are intensely debated. Traditionally, the
president has broad discretion to remove officers charged with carrying out the duties of the
chief executive.186 However, there are obvious concerns that misuse of the removal power
could prevent meaningful investigations into executive branch officials. As discussed, the
Supreme Court weighed these considerations in Morrison,187 concluding that a special
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prosecutor under the Ethics in Government Act was an inferior rather than a principal officer.188
Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court took a functionalist view, reasoning that
the attorney general’s power to remove an independent counsel and the independent
counsel’s limited duties, scope of jurisdiction, and tenure indicated that the position was one of
an inferior officer.189 This meant that an independent counsel could be appointed or removed
by individuals other than the president under the Appointments Clause.190 Although the Court
has never overruled Morrison, subsequent decisions have called its validity into question.191 The
Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the constitutionality of the DOJ’s special counsel
regulations, but similar challenges may arise under the Appointments Clause and the
separation of powers doctrine.
Aside from legal protections, political considerations might provide a powerful deterrent
against improper removal of a special counsel. In most cases, a special counsel will be selected
specifically because an investigation is politically contentious. Even if an attorney general could
fire a special counsel, it might have ruinous political consequences. The optics of removing a
special counsel investigating high-level executive officers provides the political opponents with
devastating fodder to inflame public opinion.192 Such a political firestorm occurred after the
Saturday Night Massacre.193 The incident serves as a reminder to future presidents to refrain
from similar tactics. Indeed, despite Trump’s frequent attacks, Special Counsel Mueller
completed his investigation.194 But it is likely that Trump’s frequent use of Twitter to attack
Mueller was an effort to influence the investigation or galvanize public support in his favor, as
opposed to Nixon’s more direct approach.195
As history demonstrates, the power to remove a special counsel must be carefully considered.
A special counsel who could be easily removed might be ineffective in rooting out government
corruption and misconduct. Although it is possible that political pressure will deter arbitrary or
malicious use of the removal power, relying solely on that possibility leaves the special counsel
in a precarious position. A politically savvy president or attorney general may be able to avoid
major political ramifications by advancing a misleading explanation for removing a special
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counsel. On the other hand, the limited removal power under the Ethics in Government Act was
perhaps the key factor in Congress’ decision to allow the statute to expire.196 An appropriate
legal mechanism for removal must exist that takes into account the lessons of past
investigations. The president and, by extension, the executive branch have the responsibility to
ensure that the “laws be faithfully executed.”197 Accordingly, the executive branch must be able
to remove an executive branch official who impedes this duty. At the same time, a special
counsel must be able to carry out investigations without improper interference.
1. Ethics in Government Act
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the attorney general could remove an independent
counsel for “good cause.”198 If the attorney general chose to do so, he or she would have to
notify the Special Division as well as the judiciary committees of both houses of Congress,
providing the reasons for removal. If removed, an independent counsel could challenge the
decision in court for failing to meet the “good cause” requirement.199
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations
Current DOJ guidelines resemble the Ethics in Government Act provisions on removal in many
ways, but there are several notable differences. An attorney general still must show “good
cause” to remove a special counsel.200 Unlike the Ethics in Government Act, the regulations
provide examples of “good cause,” such as “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict
of interest” or violating department policy.201 While the attorney general must provide
Congress with an explanation of his or her decision, the regulations do not envision judicial
review of removal decisions. It is possible that a politically motivated attorney general could
bypass the good cause requirement by rescinding the special counsel regulations. The attorney
general has this power because the regulations were promulgated under the attorney general’s
authority and, therefore, are subject to change at his or her discretion.202 In such a scenario, a
special counsel likely would not have grounds to challenge a termination decision in court.
3. Recommendation
Removal procedures must comply with the ambiguous standards set by the Supreme Court.
Morrison held that requiring “good cause” for removal does not violate the principle of
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separation of powers because a special prosecutor is an inferior officer.203 While Morrison has
been criticized in the years since it was decided, it has never been overruled.204 Our
recommendations assume that Morrison is still good law, notwithstanding some speculation
that the current Court may view the issue differently than in years past.205
The attorney general should retain the authority to remove a special counsel for cause. As the
supervisor of the special counsel’s work, the attorney general is in the best position to judge
whether there is good cause for removal. Special counsels should receive the protection of a
“good cause” removal standard because the nature of their investigations might pressure an
attorney general to remove them for reasons other than their performance. “Good cause”
removal is appropriate to ensure that the conflicts of interest that necessitated the
appointment of a special counsel cannot influence the investigation. This standard properly
strikes a balance between protecting the integrity of investigations and allowing for the
removal of a special counsel who fails to fulfill the office’s duties.
The attorney general’s authority to remove a special counsel should also be conditioned upon
approval from the Special Division of the judiciary responsible for appointment.206 To remove a
special counsel, the attorney general would petition the panel with the grounds for removal.
The Special Division would then determine if the reasons offered for dismissal satisfied the
good cause standard. If the Special Division agreed that removal was justified, the special
counsel’s removal would be effective and the attorney general could nominate a new special
counsel subject to the Special Division’s approval. This design remedies one of the primary
flaws with the current regulations: the lack of a way to challenge an attorney general’s removal
decision. By requiring an attorney general to preemptively justify his or her decision, this
provision would prevent pretextual claims of good cause from prevailing. Importantly, this
process preserves the autonomy of the attorney general when removal is warranted. Involving
the judiciary would also hopefully alleviate political backlash against an attorney general who
made a valid removal decision in the midst of a divisive investigation.
Although it is unorthodox to subject an attorney general’s dismissal of a subordinate to court
approval, it is likely constitutional. The strongest argument against such a system is that it
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would violate the principle of separation of powers by allowing the courts some control over
law enforcement, a traditionally executive function.207 However, Morrison already rejected this
argument as it pertained to the Ethics and Government Act.208 The only difference between our
proposed removal process and the scheme that Morrison approved is the requirement of
preemptive court approval of a removal decision. This difference should not change the legal
analysis because the attorney general would still have control over the decision; the Special
Division would only review it to ensure that there was good cause. Court approval is required
for certain law enforcement actions. Local police must seek a court approved warrant before
conducting searches of an individual’s property and the DOJ must convince the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court that FBI surveillance in certain cases is appropriate before any
surveillance can begin.209 In a case where the impartiality of the DOJ is questioned, calling upon
another branch to safeguard the veracity of the process is prudent. Undoubtedly, the
independence of each branch is vitally important, but the Supreme Court does not require that
the branches operate in complete isolation from each other.210 To create a workable system of
government, sometimes the roles of the various branches must overlap.
Supreme Court precedent since Morrison is also consistent with these changes. In Edmond v.
United States,211 the Court took a more formalistic view of analysis under the Appointments
Clause than it had in Morrison. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s view that an inferior officer is
someone supervised by a principal officer is consistent with the special counsel system.212 The
attorney general continues to supervise the special counsel throughout the process. Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board does not present any problems
for the proposal either.213 There, the Court invalidated an agency design that guarded both an
inferior officer and their supervisors with for cause protections.214 There is only one level of for
cause protection in this design, considering that the president can remove the attorney general
at will.215 Thus, the “[m]atryoshka doll of tenure protections” that the Court feared is
inapplicable to the special counsel process.216
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Termination
It is critical to have clear procedures for ending special counsel investigations. Without
transparency and accountability, investigations might come to an end prematurely.
1. Ethics in Government Act
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the independent counsel or the Special Division could
terminate an investigation.217 If the independent counsel triggered the termination, he or she
was required to notify the attorney general that the investigation was complete.218 The Special
Division could terminate an investigation when it determined that the investigation was
sufficient or at a stage where the DOJ could complete it through traditional channels.219 The
Special Division could terminate the investigation in response to a recommendation from the
attorney general.220
The Ethics in Government Act’s termination procedures protected against both interference by
the executive branch and runaway independent counsel investigations. By permitting the
attorney general to recommend termination, the process allowed the executive branch to end
investigations, as long as the Special Division agreed that it was justified. Procedures for
terminating independent counsel investigations without the consent of the impendent counsel
provided protection against limitless and unrestrained investigations.
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations
Under the current DOJ regulations, the attorney general and the special counsel have the
authority to terminate investigations.221 There is no established timeline for a special counsel
investigation’s length, but a special counsel is required to annually report the status of his or
her investigation and send budget requests to the attorney general.222 Upon review, the
attorney general can decide whether an investigation should continue and whether the budget
requested is appropriate.223 Under this system, decisions made by the attorney general
regarding the termination of an investigation may go unchecked, and the attorney general
could effectively terminate an investigation by withholding necessary funds.
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3. Recommendation
We recommend using the Ethics in Government Act’s approach to termination. Termination of
an investigation should be triggered either by the special counsel or by the attorney general
with consent from the Special Division. The Special Division would give the attorney general
deference in his or her decision, and would withhold approval only in extreme cases, such as
where there is evidence that the attorney general’s decision is attempting to obstruct the
investigation. Investigations should not have formal timelines or end dates. While there is a
legitimate concern about runaway investigations and their expense, timelines and end dates
could encourage obstruction from witnesses or those under investigation, who may attempt to
run out the clock on an investigation rather than cooperate.

Release of Findings
Special counsels have typically prepared reports summarizing their offices’ work and the
findings of their investigations. It is critical that the release of findings proceeds smoothly and
that the reports are concise and comprehensible to foster public trust. Both the Ethics in
Government Act and the current DOJ regulations capture parts of what is necessary concerning
the release of findings, but neither has proven wholly effective.
1. Ethics in Government Act
Under the Ethics in Government Act, at the termination of an investigation, the independent
counsel was mandated to complete a report and submit it to the Special Division.224 The report
detailed the independent counsel’s work throughout the investigation, including descriptions of
any prosecutions the office brought.225 Additionally, the Ethics in Government Act directed the
independent counsel to “advise the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible
information which such independent counsel receives, in carrying out the independent
counsel’s responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute grounds for an
impeachment.”226 Independent Counsel Starr provided his report regarding President Clinton to
Congress under the latter provision.227 Critics asserted that the report went into excessive
detail about Clinton’s sexual relationship with Monica Lewinski.228
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2. Current Department of Justice Regulations
Under the current DOJ regulations, a special counsel is required to submit a report to the
attorney general at the conclusion of the investigation.229 This report is confidential, and the
regulations do not provide for its disclosure to the public. The report must detail the special
counsel’s reasoning for decisions made and methods used throughout the investigation, as well
as any prosecutorial decisions.230 After receiving the special counsel’s report, the attorney
general is required to send his or her own report to the chairs and ranking members of the
Senate and House Judiciary Committees.231 The attorney general’s report must include “an
explanation for each action” taken and detail any alleged misconduct by the special counsel. 232
The regulations do not mandate that the DOJ publicly disclose any information about the
special counsel’s findings or any version of the report to members of Congress. However, the
regulations do provide that the attorney general may release the report if he or she deems
doing so to be in the public interest.233 The regulations provide the attorney general discretion
to keep the report from Congress and the public when necessary, such as when it includes
information about sensitive matters of national security, foreign relations, or ongoing
investigations. However, the expansive control that the attorney general retains might be
subject to abuse. Even members of Congress may never receive the special counsel’s full
report—only the attorney general’s abbreviated summary. This process allows for the
possibility of deliberate mischaracterizations of a special counsel’s findings. For example,
Attorney General Barr’s handling of the Mueller report faced criticism for obscuring and
misrepresenting the substance of Mueller’s findings.234
3. Recommendation
A special counsel should submit a report on the investigation directly to Congress, namely the
chairs and ranking members of both chambers’ judiciary committees, without the attorney
general’s involvement. This would allow the special counsel’s findings and conclusions to reach
a bipartisan group of lawmakers, who are in a position to act on information in the report if
they deem it necessary. It is also consistent with Congress’ constitutionally implied oversight
powers.235
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Given that the attorney general would not oversee the release of information about special
counsel investigations, it is imperative to set clear standards for reporting to ensure both
fairness and propriety. Accordingly, the report should focus only on federal crimes that the
special counsel uncovered. The report should include clear statements of what crimes the
special counsel concluded were committed, including by the president. While Special Counsel
Mueller believed he was prohibited from making such a pronouncement about the president
due to the Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that asserts that the president is immune from
criminal indictment while in office, we believe that a clear statement on criminality is
permissible and necessary. Though this raises questions of fairness due to the president’s
inability to present a defense in court, the statement does not deprive the president of his or
her liberty. Additionally, the president has a unique and extremely prominent platform to
defend himself or herself.236 Finally, the special counsel’s report should include an executive
summary containing key findings and conclusions. This summary must be clear, concise, and
comprehensible, but should consist of narrative detail of the investigation, going beyond a
general statement. This will allow Congress and the public at large (if it is released to them), to
understand the key takeaways of the investigations.

III. Conclusion
To create a fair and effective system for investigating the executive branch, the rules for special
counsel regulations must balance independence and accountability. While prosecutorial and
law enforcement responsibilities have traditionally fallen within the purview of the executive
branch, there are times when those powers must be shared with other branches to ensure
impartial investigations of certain government officials. Accordingly, our recommendations seek
to address that balance by dividing power and decision-making between the attorney general
and Special Division of the federal judiciary, while providing Congress means of sufficient
oversight.
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